Tenuous land access contributes to food and livelihood insecurity, and fuels conflicts in many rural societies. In such cases, the ability of government legal institutions to structure and ultimately transform the conflict depends not just on the adoption of laws favorable to progressive land redistribution, but also the effective implementation of those laws in the face of elite influence in local government. This paper presents a case study of an identity-based social movement for Outcastes in India (the Navsarjan Trust) struggling to bring about the successful implementation of land redistribution laws in Gujarat, India. I contend the Dalit land movement recognizes outcomes of state policy as products of caste struggles within a nested hierarchy of local government institutions. I argue Navsarjan's strategy is to modify the strength of links between levels in this hierarchy in order to produce favorable results for the Dalit land rights movement. This strategy explodes the myth of human rights movements as necessarily antagonistic to government function, portraying government rather as a framework that structures social struggle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tenuous land access contributes to food and livelihood insecurity, and fuels conflicts in many rural societies. 1 In such cases, the ability of government legal institutions to structure and ultimately transform the conflict depends not just on the adoption of laws favorable to progressive land redistribution, but also the effective implementation of those laws in the face of elite influence in local government.
2 This study examines how Dalit (i.e., 'Outcaste') activism in India brings about government-mandated land redistribution in the face of caste-based violence intended to enforce a socioeconomic status quo. For millennia, Dalits have been a landless people, and their struggle speaks to the problem of mobilizing effectively for equitable development. This study examines the efforts of the Navsarjan Trust, the NGO face of a transnational pro-Dalit social movement, in promoting Dalit land rights in Surendranagar district, Gujarat. Navsarjan contend that land tenure patterns underpin socioeconomic stratification by systematically marginalizing agricultural laborers and rendering the assetbuilding process slow or impossible.
The case is an important one because it demonstrates that transnational social movements arising in reaction to neoliberal globalization 3 need not in all cases undermine the legitimacy of the state after the fashion described by Armao. Armao asserts that states are now self-deconstructing in the reverse order of Stein Rokkan's model of state formation, expelling the masses and inviting parasitical participation of interest groups. While this description may characterize some social movements, the transnational Dalit movement actually reinforces the hegemony of the central state, albeit a state reinterpreted as a more proactive and socially progressive entity.
Accordingly, I argue that Gujarati land reform activism does not follow the intuitively sensible model of activist movements in which political actions of the state have a centralizing effect, provoking countervailing reactions from the marginalized periphery, or "movement and counter-movement". 4 Theories of central action and peripheral reaction cannot adequately explain the purposive formation of the Dalit land movement in the face of (a) progressive federal and state laws ostensibly fostering Dalit claims to land, and (b) a robust bureaucracy charged with their implementation. Rather, I contend that the Dalit land movement recognizes the outcomes of state policy as products of a struggle among caste interests structured within a nested hierarchy of local government institutions. To borrow a phrase from Rajagopal, local government institutions constitute a "terrain of contestation". 5 Since, in this case, the social movement is not trying to shape the law from below (as Rajagopal describes), but to assure its implementation from above, I contend the battleground shifts from Rajagopal's courts and legislative institutions to the hierarchy of local governments charged with implementing legislation favorable to the social movement. Navsarjan's strategy is to modify the strength of the links between levels in this nested game-oftentimes by allowing Dalit land appeals to bypass lower, less progressive levels of government in favor of higher ones-in order to produce positive results for the Dalit land rights movement.
There are two primary reasons why Navsarjan, and the Dalit movement more generally, strengthen, and not undermine, the felt presence of the central state in India. The first is that the problem the Dalit movement addresses is not geographically restricted to a certain area of the country. Caste-based oppression exists in all areas of India, and indeed across South Asia as a whole (including the non-Hindu majority countries of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, not to mention Nepal). The society in which the struggle is taking place is one that Horowitz 6 would term "ranked." Across the region (and especially in rural areas), Dalits generally find themselves at the bottom of a socioeconomic hierarchy characterized by horizontal social cleavages. They do not form a nationally cohesive political identity group capable of acting in relative unity against competing groups or an exploitative political system (as might tribes in West African "unranked" societies characterized by vertical social cleavages). Spread thinly and evenly across South Asia, Dalits cannot hope to achieve secession from society. The lower layers in a stratified agrarian society will not likely be independently politically represented, but rather will share leaders with the strata above them. 7 When lower strata do have political leaders, Horowitz 8 suggests that they must ultimately satisfy the criterion of acceptability to superordinate groups. He contends that for oppressed strata in a ranked society, there are a finite number of strategies for redress: (a) displace one's superiors, (b) dissolve ethnic distinctions between strata completely, (c) raise one's position objectively, or (d) attempt to transform the society into an unranked system. Unable to attempt strategies (a) or (b), the Dalit movement is split between (c) and, in the case of Navsarjan, (d) -working toward its radical restructuring. For this reason, this study does not deal with a violent social movement eroding state legitimacy, but rather a legalistic, human rights-based one that combats low-grade chronic violence intended to conserve a rigid socioeconomic status quo by effectively allying itself with an aspirational legitimacy of the state (even while questioning the present basis of that legitimacy).
The second reason that the Dalit movement -and particularly the Navsarjan-led push for land redistribution -is a cohesive force in the Indian state is that Navsarjan has found it effective to structure itself as a mirror image of state and local governments. In this way, Navsarjan provides friendly parallel channels for Dalits to access the same federal and state services -and in so doing, increases central authoritative oversight over local governments. This structure serves constantly to remind central authorities of ground realities -a strategy that would not be nearly as effective if a neoliberal ideology had always been central to national identity. In fact, however, post-Independence India was far from the liberalized, emerging capitalist polity it has become over the past 20 years. It had adopted early pro-Human Rights stances on apartheid.
9 In 1949, it adopted the most progressive constitution ever seen, seeking to redress the radical economic, social and political disparities that persisted between castes in a visionary presaging of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. Progressive constitutional intentions were impeded in reality, however, by the compromise struck with conservatives demanding "states rights." Thus, when the federal government adopted land redistribution legislation in 1960, states were allowed, not mandated, to adopt some version of it, and implementation varied widely. With the gradual opening of the economy in the 1980s, the state's proactive development stance weakened, and a laissez-faire industrial policy slowly began to take hold.
For these two reasons, the Navsarjan-led Dalit movement is not, as Lynch 10 has accurately described many social movements in the age of economic globalization as relegated to monitoring civil and political rights, while the neoliberal project advances unchecked. In fact, India's own state land redistribution schemes have had a generally negative impact on agricultural productivity. 11 Instead, the movement serves as a clarion call to the state to take up again the mantle of economic, social and cultural rights that it had championed in its youth, showcasing the disconnect between those discursive symbols of popular state legitimacy and local government inaction in present-day rural India.
Navsarjan's strategy -garnering funds and technical support from transnational networks of donors, academics and activists, while functioning as parallel local governments for rural Dalits -belies the "monolithic" state as a somewhat disarticulated, Foucaultian complex of savoirs and functions, many of which are performed at numerous spatial scales, both above and below the level of the state itself.
12 However, the fact that Navsarjan's strategy continually places the ultimate responsibility for the implementation of adopted law on the state and federal government serves as implicit endorsement of central authority over local governments, which tend to be much more tightly bound to local elite interests. Navsarjan's experience hints that the role of a social movement in relation to the state is not always purely antagonistic, but may be facultative.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the remainder of Section 1, I lay out the historical and legal context of Gujarati land reforms. In Section 2, I assess the effects of proximity of sub-state government offices to one another on the implementation of land reform legislation, thereby highlighting a nested battleground of competing caste interests. In Section 3, I examine Navsarjan's tactics in the land redistribution movement, arguing that the organization implicitly recognizes the nested game being played out in the government hierarchy.
This study bases its quantitative analyses on two surveys administered by the Navsarjan Trust in 1995-6 and 2006 respectively. 13 It draws qualitative conclusions from interviews with officials in Surendranagar district and Navsarjan fieldworkers, and focus group discussions with Dalits who applied for redistributable lands.
I administered these interviews and focus groups discussions in July of 2006 and January of 2007.
A. Gujarati Land Reform Legislation
The history of legal reform in Gujarat is Janus-faced; the state is famed for its progressive land policies, and notorious for its recalcitrance in enforcing those policies.
14 Today, two principal pieces of legislation shape the process of land redistribution: the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act (1960) , and the Government Lands Programme. The 1960 Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act fixed the maximum land area tenable by a single rural owner at 132 acres (reduced in 1976 to 54 acres) 15 and dictated that the surplus be allotted to Dalits, tribal peoples, and Other Backward Castes (OBCs). The Act came early in a period of similar legislation passed in other states.
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The state Agricultural Land Ceiling Acts have, on paper, generally worked to various degrees, boosting inter-caste land equity.
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Gujarat ranks poorly against its state competitors in ALCA redistribution: it is only around one-fourth as effective as other states in terms of Dalit beneficiaries per total population (Ibid.).
To be redistributed under the ALCA, lands must first be declared surplus before navigating a complex bureaucracy, greatly reducing their chances of successful cultivation by intended beneficiaries.
This study deals with bureaucratic implementation, but does not address the question of a parcel's original declaration as surplus. In India as a whole, just 2.5% of lands originally 13 Navsarjan administered two surveys to Dalit recipients of redistributed land: one in 1995-1996 written by Navsarjan staff, the second written by me in July of 2006 in consultation with Navsarjan's Land Redistribution Programme fieldworkers. Both surveys concentrated on Surendranagar district. This survey's intended function was to assess the impact of the High Court's ruling of 1999, mandating local governments' expedited handover of lands officially redistributed to Dalits, but which were, in reality, not in their possession. For more details, see the author's previous master's thesis under the same title, McDougal, Topher L., Law of the Landless: The Dalit Bid for Land Redistribution in Gujarat, India (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2007) . 14 Navsarjan Trust, The Story of Land Reforms in Gujarat (Ahmedabad, 2000) . 15 M.L. Jindal, Gujarat Local Acts: 1827 -1983 (Jodhpur: India Publishing House, 1985 The Government Lands Programme, a parallel state-run program granting long-term leases, authorizes local governments to allot "government wastelands" to priority demographics (including Dalits). In Gujarat, the scale of this program has far outstripped that of the ALCA. The allotment of state leaseholds is less politically contentious than the systematic stripping of private property from powerful upper-caste members, as well as being less permanent. Navsarjan contends that a substitution of wastelands for ALCA lands therefore takes place, which is broadly considered unfavorable to Dalits. Survey results and interviews for this study suggest that intensive improvement investments required for government lands deter Dalits from cultivating.
B. Navsarjan's Public Interest Litigation
In April 1999, Navsarjan galvanized the local Dalit communities in four talukas (i.e., sub-district administrative blocks) of Surendranagar district in Saurashtra (namely Sayla, Vadhwan, Limbdi, and Lakhtar) to file a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) in the Gujarat High Court against various local and state offices. In the PIL, Navsarjan documented over 6,000 acres of lands in Surendranagar district that had been officially allotted to 700 Dalit families according to the District Collector's office, but which their 1995-6 survey had found to be either unaccompanied by the necessary title documentation, or not actually in the hands of the intended beneficiaries. The Court ruled that the state must complete its survey and distribution of the surplus lands by 15 June 2000. Navsarjan suspected that the Court's ruling went largely unheeded. The group recently completed a follow-up survey, with help from the author, to obtain a portrait of the status of land-holdings in the wake of the ruling.
C. Land Reform Implementation
Various levels of the Indian government jointly carry out land reforms. Governmental subdivisions at sub-state levels form a Weberian hierarchy of three ascending tiers: village, taluka, and district. Information and influence do not simply flow down from top to bottom, but also percolate up from the ground level 18 Aloysius Irudayam, Black Paper: Broken Promises and Dalits Betrayed (Bangalore: NCDHR, 1999) . 19 See Navsarjan Trust, supra note 14.
-the hierarchy is, in effect, contested ground. Navsarjan 20 reported in 2000 that only around one-third of those lands officially redistributed on paper (or roughly 50,000 of 150,000 acres were in fact in the possession of the intended recipients. Two possible explanations might account for this low success rate: (1) the government bureaucracy is failing Dalit applicants in the implementation stages, or (2) social pressures exerted on the ground by upper-caste members prevent Dalits from claiming their rights. In fact, the two are not independent of one another. I argue below that the hierarchy of local governments is an institutional framework in which the interests of large landholders contest Dalit land claims and attempt to undermine the intended effects of progressive legislation.
The responsibilities of officials collectively responsible for land redistribution are given in Table 1 .
Officials in the first category (village/panchayat level) are elected, while officials in the latter two categories (taluka and district levels) are appointed. At the taluka level, the (elected) state government appoints local politicians and technocrats, while at the district level, the central government appoints a mix of local and out-of-state bureaucrats. Thus, the chain of command would suggest a gradient of contact and alignment with local interests. The process for selecting parcels for redistribution, which falls outside the purview of this study, differs depending on whether lands are distributed under the ALCA or Government Lands Programme. 21 This study concentrates on the implementation process, which is identical for both land types and is enumerated in Table 2 . Table 2 . The process of implementing land reforms is shared by both the ALCA and the Government Lands programs
Step Description 1
Mamlatdar informs the recipients of land awarded to them, as well as its approximate location. 2 Recipient confirms to the Mamlatdar his intention to cultivate the land. 3
The Revenue Circle Officer, Surveyor and Talati convene at the parcel to mark the bounds and notify the successful applicant(s) of the exact measurements taken.
4
The Talati conveys the khatavahi, or land ledger, to the land recipients. 5
Recipients take possession and begin to pay land revenue to the Circle Revenue Officer. 6
In the case of a boundary dispute or need of more precise clarification on metes and bounds, the Mamlatdar requests the office of the District Inspector of Land Records to send a more highly trained surveyor. Source: the author
II. DETERMINANTS OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION SUCCESS
This section uses the abridged results of regression analyses performed on the 2006 survey data 23 to argue that the government hierarchy is a contested terrain, with entrenched local interests at the ground level pushing upward through nested local governments against central redistributive legislation. From this idea flow a couple of testable hypotheses:
1. The farther away appointed officials (at the district level) responsible for land redistribution are geographically, the more difficulties the land redistribution process will encounter at the local government level and on the ground due to transaction costs in rural Gujarat;
The first two hypotheses depend on a correlation between geographical and bureaucratic distances that was repeatedly described in interviews and focus groups. Explored in order are: this study's design, the determinants of land redistribution breakdowns, and a short exposition on the differential treatment of ALCA and government wasteland redistribution. Not covered are the positive and negative socioeconomic outcomes of land redistribution.
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A. Study Design I designed the survey to focus on what types of bureaucratic breakdowns occurred in each case of land redistribution to Dalit recipients. Each breakdown is associated with a level of local government. Table 3 categorizes the most important "breakdowns" by level of government, from Level 0 (ground level) to Level 1 (village level) to Level 2 (taluka level). The district level is not considered here because it falls outside this study's scope to make inter-district comparisons. Government-level breakdowns are defined as failures of the government bureaucracy to fulfill the functions of its mandated role in the redistribution process. Breakdowns on the ground level, by contrast, consist of social and community pressures that are actively brought to bear for the purpose of discouraging Dalit land possession. I argue that violence "on the ground" emerges under institutional conditions favorable to the persistence of socioeconomic caste disparities. A certain positive circular reinforcement is at work: institutions may allow for continued de facto "patrimonialism," and in turn powerful landlords benefiting from the social arrangement push for their brand of local government.
25
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The trick, then, is to understand how the cycle can be reversed.
The first type of ground-level breakdown listed in Table 3 occurs if hostility erupts at the scene of a survey where the Circle Revenue Officer, Talati, and taluka Surveyor arrive to mete out the land. This is more often the case with ALCA lands than government wastelands, since there is almost always a de facto upper-caste "encroacher" (the original owner). However, government lands may already be under cultivation by others, often upper-caste members. For instance, in one village, Dalits reported that the village Darbars (local elites) allowed other upper-caste members to cultivate government lands, but forbade Dalits to do likewise. The second type of ground-level breakdown occurs when a hostile encroacher prevents the Dalit title recipient from making beneficial use of his/her land. The encroachers were often the owners or de facto cultivators of the land prior to redistribution.
B. Results for Breakdown Predictors
This section will briefly report the results of a series of statistical analyses testing hypotheses 1-3 above at the ground, village and taluka levels. The explanatory power of the models fell as they analyzed consecutively higher levels of government, suggesting that local conditions and interests have less influence on policy implementation efforts that occur at higher levels of government. Shortcomings of the models used are discussed in McDougal. , 1998) . He argues that the transition from feudalism, as embodied in the Zamindari system, to what he terms the "patrimonialism" that characterized postindependence land relations consisted of a shift from the supremacy of those skilled in war to those who require, and take advantage of, the legal system and government officials to legitimize their power. Thus, while the Zamindari system was a system of production in which Zamindars depended upon the Marxian appropriation of a peasant surplus, patrimonialism can be seen in a more Weberian tradition as a social system, too. 27 See McDougal, supra note 13, pp. 98-99. ground. Ceteris paribus, for every ten obstacles that a village-level government presents, another 4.5 obstacles are generated at the ground level. In the course of the interviews for this study the most common explanation for this synergistic phenomenon is the fact that strong village elites often control the local government, aligning political interests with those of large landholders and creating a favorable environment for further Dalit oppression on the ground. In one village, for example, the powerful Darbar "village king" has strong connections to the local government. He bemoaned the partial devolution of economic power to lower castes. Asked to describe his relationship with the talati, the "village king" offered to order him to attend our interview. He added that he (the Darbar landholder) retains enough social standing to dictate to local voters who will be sarpanch (village mayor). Although the latter position is technically elected, it is not unusual in small villages for the descendents of Zamindars (feudal landholders) to instruct villagers on whom they should vote for.
Geographic distance between government offices plays a key role in establishing the administrative hierarchy as contested terrain. On the one hand, greater distances between local taluka headquarters and district headquarters are associated with redistribution failures due to local violence. Navsarjan fieldworkers claim long travel times lead to reduced district-level supervision, which in turn breeds corruption at taluka headquarters. Fieldworkers contend that taluka magistrates are thus less likely to use scarce resources to pay for police escorts during surveys and easement allotments, and local mobs may influence the survey procedure or prevent the Dalit beneficiary from taking possession. This is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1, above.
Conversely, greater distances between the village and taluka headquarters are generally associated an even larger decrease in breakdowns occurring on the ground -evidence for hypothesis 2 above. Assessing the situation under the paradigm of top-down administration, this finding appears counter-intuitive: shouldn't one expect to find that as the distance grows, it becomes harder for taluka officials to ensure redistribution measures are carried out on the ground? Actually, this finding may be evidence for the view that influence in the administrative structure runs bi-directionally. The farther away the taluka headquarters, the less pressure can be brought to bear on taluka officials by powerful landholders. The taluka officials interviewed admitted to being under constant pressure to balance the interests of "the community" against their mandates. By contrast, the Deputy Collector interviewed, further removed from local interests and appointed by the federal government, took offense at any implication he might be subject to social pressures compromising his neutrality.
Other significant variables that affected ground-level breakdowns, but which nonetheless fall outside of this study's primary focus, include the incidence of poverty, labor market thickness, land type, and land value. Village poverty incidence is positively correlated with ground-level breakdowns, possibly because generally poor Dalit farmers have little capacity to improve and irrigate land, or store agricultural produce to wait out price troughs. They are economically more vulnerable, and are more easily bullied off the land -especially when the land itself is marginal.
Interestingly, thick agricultural labor markets were significantly associated with ground-level breakdowns, conceivably because marginal (often migrant) laborers depress agricultural wages, allowing outmoded socioeconomic institutions to persist and raising the burden of debt shouldered by this Dalit-dominated demographic. The type -and therefore desirability -of land also affects the incidence of implementation failures due to violence. Recipients of government land have, holding other variables constant, 22% fewer violent incidents to contend with than recipients of ALCA lands. Presumably, this is because, in addition to social taboos against Dalit land ownership, ALCA land recipients have to contend with former landowners seeking to retain control over their former properties. Finally, the higher the value of the parcel in question, the more likely obstacles to Dalit cultivation will arise in the community. This fact probably reflects the great desirability of fertile lands in a semi-arid area.
Village-Level Breakdowns
As when assessing breakdowns at the ground level, breakdowns at the village level are most strongly associated with breakdowns one level up -now at the taluka level -corroborating Hypothesis 3. Like before, the presence of poverty also correlates positively with breakdowns.
Geographic distance again plays an important role in village-level land redistribution, corroborating our Hypotheses 1 and 2. The farther the taluka headquarters is from the district headquarters, the more barriers the village government puts up to redistribution measures, presumably owing to weaker state oversight. Likewise, long distances from village to taluka headquarters also contribute to village-level breakdowns. Here, we may want to pause for reflection, though: previously, we saw that increasing distance between village and taluka decreased breakdowns at the ground level. Why should the village level be any different? I would argue that we are observing two distinct pathways of influence, each running in the opposite direction. That is, the effects at the ground level stem from the ability (albeit decaying over distance) of community members to influence taluka government through personal petition -a right they are entitled to, and do, exercise. However, the verticalized influence pathways within the nested structure of local government are not designed to flow upward. Information may flow upward, as in the case of talatis alerting mamlatdars to the presence of ALCA-eligible lands, who in turn then alert the Deputy and District Collector. However, policy only flows downward.
Taluka-Level Breakdowns
Breakdowns in land reform implementation at the taluka level take the form of either a failure to supply a title to the land in question, or a failure to survey the land. The latter point is more nuanced than it first seems. Survey-related threats to the redistribution process typically occur in two major variants:
A failure to survey, in whole or in part. This problem occurs more frequently in the case of government lands than with ALCA lands. An astonishing 35% of government lands recipients in Surendranagar district reported an unperformed or incomplete survey of their lands, as opposed to only 18% among recipients of ALCA lands. One possible explanation for the variance in survey enforceability is that lands falling under ALCA jurisdiction are presumably less likely to be designated eligible for redistribution in the first place, since this involves the talati or mamlatdar identifying them as such. Therefore, the comparison is skewed from the beginning, and prospective ALCA lands that might have brought out the armed encroachers upon survey, are still safe in the hands of the original landowners;
A failure to provide a necessary easement. Many Dalit farmers (29% among ALCA recipients, 15% among government lands recipients) reported receiving land unaccompanied by an easement necessary either to access or irrigate it. Interviews with Dalit land recipients suggest that the reason for this is that any prospective easement for their land would necessarily run through upper-caste property, and thus was not granted. Navsarjan field staff claim ALCA lands exhibit this characteristic more often simply because redistributed private land tends to be located near un-redistributed private land, whereas government lands tend to be near other government lands. Critically, this issue is related to survey failures, in that upper-caste landowners often choose which part of their land will be surveyed for redistribution. Not only does this practice ensure that the worst of private lands is conveyed by the redistribution mechanism, but also makes it likely that the parcel will be inaccessible from public roads, further decreasing the likelihood of actual possession. Despite its strong connection with the first survey-related problem, Navsarjan staff claim that taluka officials do not often take up the easement question, and it is thus not included in the first analysis.
Fewer local factors have impacts on taluka-level implementation breakdowns than on those at the village level, and the model loses much of its explanatory power. Again, consonant with Hypotheses 1 and 2, great distances between taluka and district headquarters are related to implementation failures. Interestingly, while the proportion of the population designated as Scheduled Castes (Dalits) did not influence outcomes at lower levels, at the taluka level, applications from Dalit-heavy villages are more likely to encounter problems. We might hypothesize that villages with many Dalits produce many applications, overwhelming the taluka's capacity to cope. One taluka surveyor stated that he was the only surveyor for 75 villages, and that his office was seriously understaffed. Finally, small parcels appear to encounter problems at the taluka level, possibly because survey errors have a larger impact on small parcels.
When easement-related problems are attributed to the taluka government, geographical distances (village-to-district, village-to-taluka, and taluka-to-district) account for the three strongest predictive factors. As the distances between villages and taluka headquarters, and taluka and district headquarters, rise, so to do the costs of covering those distances. On issues of surveying and title allotment, the mamlatdar's office (and particularly the surveyor and Revenue Circle Officer) is directly accountable to the Deputy and District Collectors. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that greater distances lower accountability and increase discretion. Similarly, as the distance rises between the taluka office and the village, it becomes less likely for the survey process to be performed with all three mandated participants: Revenue Circle Officer, surveyor, and talati. Since the two most likely not to be present as a result of great distances are the Revenue Circle Officer and the taluka surveyor, the process may be relatively more influenced by the talati (who, as we have established, often serves at the pleasure of the local large landholder) and the gathering villagers. Even if both taluka officials are present to mete out the property, the taluka police may be less likely come great distances, and mobs of encroachers may intimidate the officials. Conversely, the closer the village is to the district headquarters, the less likely taluka-level breakdowns are to occur.
The likely explanation for this phenomenon is that the survey does not ask which institution performed the land survey. Most often, it is the taluka surveyor, but in the case of a dispute or complaint, the matter goes to the district land surveyor in Surendranagar. Therefore, the lower the transaction costs involved in notifying the district land surveyor and getting him or her to resurvey the land, the likelier it is that talukalevel problems can be remedied. Again, we see that the local government hierarchy is host to multiple competing interests that in turn have multiple avenues for advancing their interests.
C. Differential Treatment of ALCA and Government Lands
The implementation of the land reforms impacts ALCA and government lands differentially. Generally speaking, recipients of ALCA lands are plagued with more and greater hurdles to cultivation than government land cultivators when dealing with their local governments or their communities. Surveyors perform their mandated duties less frequently. Talatis will more easily allow the distribution of lands without access easements, as well as the persistence of encroachments on official village records. On the ground, community members are more likely to resort to threats, violence, and intimidation to keep Dalits from farming, and encroachers are more likely to resist ejection.
Two notable exceptions prove the rule: official title is more often granted to ALCA recipients than to government land farmers, and the khatavahis, or land ledgers, are more reliably provided to them. This may be because most ALCA parcels were redistributed earlier than most government wastelands, at a time when less overall demand for agricultural land existed. Thus, district, taluka, and village land offices may not have found themselves in the state of over-taxation to which many interviewed bureaucrats alluded. Another, more cynical, explanation is that, since the ALCA is the state government's flagship land reform programme and is consequently subject to a incessant public scrutiny, it behooves district collectors to distribute the largest possible proportion of the officially-declared ALCA land titles. Under this alternative explanation, whether lower government offices take the necessary steps to ensure those titles are more than empty promises is of less concern. Whatever the reason, it is interesting to note that despite the greater desirability of ALCA lands with respect to government lands, the incidences of encroachment are quite comparable-perhaps because the selection process of ALCA lands tends not to redistribute the majority of eligible properties.
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III. ACTIVISM AND INTERVENTION
In the following section, I describe Navsarjan's organizational strategy as a reflection of the land redistribution process. I argue that Navsarjan implicitly understands the nested game that plays out at various levels of government, and accordingly gears its strategy to modifying the linkages between levels such that Dalit farmers benefit. I conclude with reflection on implications for our understanding of contemporary state-civil society relations.
A. Navsarjan's Three-Pronged Strategy
In Navsarjan's December 1996 letter to the Surendranagar District Collector's office detailing cases of failure in land redistribution implementation (the precursor to the suit filed with the High Court of Gujarat in Ahmedabad in April of 1999), the group describes itself as follows: "Navsarjan Trust" is a voluntary organization which provides assistance, education and legal aid to the poor people and also on the issues of violation of human rights [sic] ." 28 This statement encapsulates not only the organization's purpose, but also its operational strategy. Rearranging the stated aspects of this strategy to align with the forgoing analysis of nested government (i.e., starting at the ground level and working up), we may state that the prongs of Navsarjan's advocacy offensive are:
Education.
Navsarjan employs fieldworkers whose primary responsibility is to inform Dalit villagers of their legal rights with respect to the land reforms and the other relevant legislation, such as the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.
Bureaucratic facilitation. Navsarjan fieldworkers inform village Dalits of lands that have been made available for redistribution, and help them to fill out and return the appropriate land redistribution forms.
Legal aid. Navsarjan brings, or threatens to bring, legal actions against non-performing government bodies.
These three prongs may roughly equate to three tiers of engagement: at the ground level, at the level of local government, and at the level of state government (through the court system). Because Navsarjan works simultaneously on these three tiers, the organization is able to choose at what level it will expend its limited resources for a particular challenge.
Education
Education consists of a mundane and a radical component. The mundane component involves the diffusion of legal knowledge to reduce information asymmetries in the struggle for socioeconomic equality. Rural Gujarat has a literacy rate of just 51.4%, as compared to urban Gujarat's 71.2%.
29 These numbers drop drastically for various minority groups. For instance, the literacy 28 See Navsarjan Trust, supra note 14. 29 Government of India, Census of India (New Delhi, 2001 ). rate among Dalit women in India was just under 24% in 2001. 30 Dalit farmers may not have easy access to, or even the ability to read, the local periodicals in which parcel availability is published.
The radical component to education is as necessary as it is difficult to quantify: bolstering the will of the Dalit community to stand up for their rights. As Navsarjan workers repeated told a group of Dalit farmers in one village upon receiving a host of land-related complaints, "You must stand up and fight for your own issues -don't just tell us your woes." This "fighting spirit" has little to do with the size of the Dalit population -indeed, the percentage of Scheduled Castes per the India Census 2001 never once proved a statistically significant determinant of breakdowns at any level. In one village surveyed, for example, Dalits comprised around 8.1% of the total village population in 2000 31 -1.2 percentage points higher than the rural Gujarati average. And yet, that village is notorious for the firm grip its Darbars keep on the reins of power. Tragic recent episodes illustrated that small Dalit populations may not be the cause but rather the effect of land relations. In March of 2003, according to local Dalits, a brother of one local "village king" got into an altercation with a local Dalit who complained the brother was stealing large, construction-worthy stones from his land. The Darbar formed a small band of friends who stabbed and killed the Dalit later that afternoon -a crime that has gone untried. Since then, local Dalits report anecdotally that about half of the Dalit residents fled for larger, nearby urban centers. A stroll through the former Dalit quarter confirms that many of the houses are still abandoned, or appropriated by other caste groups.
Navsarjan attributes many successes on the ground to the mindset of local Dalits, which, they contend, is fortified by knowledge of their legal rights and recourses. When asked why Darbars in Ori choose to bribe Dalits not to take possession of their rightful land, whereas Darbars in Talsana need only resort to open threats of physical violence, Navsarjan fieldworkers point to historical idiosyncrasies peculiar to each region that in turn manifest in differing expectations of what is possible in the minds of Dalits. In Talsana, they say, the Grahak, or bonded labor, system was particularly prevalent during Zamindari times, and landowner clout thus carries over into the present. Today's landowners still have many Dalits in their employ as bonded laborers, and it is to the latter that the landowners legally conceded their surplus lands upon the passage of the ALCA. The Dalits might legally own the surplus lands, but the Darbars essentially own the Dalits themselves through debt bondage. Thus, neither Darbar nor Dalit ever expected that the Dalits would ever truly receive possession. Navsarjan employees also marshal other examples to emphasize the importance of Dalit mindsets in successful land redistribution. They say that in some villages, when Navsarjan originally brought the affidavit to Dalit farmers so that they could sign it and put their complaints on public record, the Dalits brought the documents straight to their landlord and asked him whether they should in fact sign. He advised them against it, and they backed down. In Ghanejada village, the taluka issued three consecutive orders to the Dalits to take possession of their allotted lands, but the Dalits refused. On the other hand, in Khadi village, one man fought for his rights and successfully took possession-an act that galvanized his peers to do likewise. As important as courage, will, and determination are, though, it is extremely difficult to measure them, nor did this survey even attempt to do so. Furthermore, even one could find an accurate metric for it, "strong will" may still be a confounding variable for knowledge of one's legal rights, or for Navsarjan's willingness to prosecute atrocities committed against Dalits.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Navsarjan employees downplay the importance of Dalit mindset when speaking to local government officials, though. When one talati asserted a very similar theory to that previously expressed by Navsarjan ("[t] he subservient mindset of the Dalits themselves is the cause of their unwillingness to take possession of their lands"), Navsarjan employees countered that the primary responsibility lay with the Taluka government and their powers of police protection during the delicate period of title transfer.
Bureaucratic Facilitation
Navsarjan also functions to reduce Dalit transaction costs in navigating the bureaucracy of land administration. They do this first by informing Dalits of the land, and second by helping Dalits to fill out and submit the application paperwork, and to confirm title receipt (thereby notifying the surveyor the land is ready to be meted out). In some cases during the mid-1990s, when Navsarjan was just beginning to work on the land redistribution issue, District Collectors and Mamlatdars had recorded the award of land titles to Dalit beneficiaries, but the socalled "beneficiaries" themselves had not ever received word of the award. In such cases, Navsarjan also served to facilitate the flow of information down to the ground level. Thus, Navsarjan's efficacy is not only linked to its antagonistic role vis-à-vis the state, but also to its embeddedness with the state that increase the access to and effectiveness of government institutions for Dalits.
Legal Aid
The PIL filed in 1999 illustrates that Navsarjan gives Dalits recourse to the law that they probably would not otherwise have. Furthermore, the suit was lent extra weight by the fact that Navsarjan was co-petitioner with "Jamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti," a group of affected citizens who banded together at Navsarjan's suggestion. In this way, Navsarjan's PIL carried the authenticity of a spontaneous local movement. While Navsarjan staff contend that they always aim to work alongside local communities in equal partnership, they also claim that Hamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti would never have been born without public awareness campaigns carried out by Navsarjan.
Of the 6,000 acres that the PIL originally singled out as not having been in the possession of the intended Dalit beneficiaries, around 2,000 still remained in January of 2007. Of course, the almost 4,000 acres that have since been restored to Dalits are not necessary under their cultivation, for a host of reasons discussed above. Nevertheless, the improvement appears to be drastic by all accounts. It is difficult to discern how much of this shift is due directly to the PIL, though. It could be argued that state government was making progress on land reforms even in the absence of Navsarjan. Most of the Dalits interviewed, though, had received land titles or promises of land titles long before Navsarjan became involved in Surendrangar district in 1995. Most testified to the crucial role Navsarjan played in overcoming bureaucratic inertia or local community resistance. Some Dalits in Kanpur had effectively been in a holding pattern since their original application in 1967 when Navsarjan intervened in 1995, getting the promised land surveyed that same year. Likewise in one village, a man claimed that he originally faced resistance from the former landlord until Navsarjan interceded with the local government.
Navsarjan's role as bureaucratic facilitator also bleeds into its role as legal activist. For officially filing suit in the Gujarat High Court is merely at one (adversarial) extreme end of a spectrum of strategies that make use of government institutions. It also exemplifies one of Navsarjan's key strategies: bypassing local governments less amenable to their cause for higher-level governments that may bring pressure to bear on them. Navsarjan staff have observed that threatening to take legal action can oftentimes be as effective as actually taking it. This, they claim, is the case in one taluka formerly notorious for its regressive government, but whose officials now consult Navsarjan before taking action on land reform issues and invite their fieldworkers to attend land surveys. Presumably, the mamlatdar, himself an upper caste-member, prefers dealing with Navsarjan directly to dealing with reproaches from the District Collector. The threat of legal action can also embolden Dalits to make use of Navsarjan's land rights education, legal support in the case of an atrocity.
Land Reform Progress
Whatever the reason, there has been a noticeable improvement in local governments' performance of those functions constituting land reform implementation from 1996 to 2006 (see Figure 2) .
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Taluka and village governments showed remarkable improvement in all comparable categories, save granting title to ALCA lands, in which 1996 and 2006 exhibited roughly similar numbers. Most strikingly, the general change trend (as depicted by red midpoint lines) seems to drift farther into positive territory at higher levels of government. The least amount of progress has been made at the ground level, with actual possession making modest but tangible gains, and non-encroachment (counting partial encroachments) remaining more or less unchanged. 32 The 1996 and 2006 surveys had few directly corresponding questions. Furthermore, for reasons relating to 1996 data reporting, it is impossible to compare the same four talukas. Rather, the 1996 data refers to four talukas located nearby, but in different districts: Viramgam taluka in Ahmedabad district, Vallabhipur taluka in Bhavnagar district, Degham taluka in Gandhinagar district, and Jasdan taluka in Rajkot district. Nevertheless, Surendranagar district has the worst reputation in terms of land reform implementation (the reason Navsarjan started working there in the first place), and so if there is a regional bias, it will likely be against, rather than for, improvement in government performance during the intervening years.
The method of data reporting for the 1996 Navsarjan survey in the four Surendranagar talukas surveyed in 2006 was to report the absolute number of instances of government failures in the land reform implementation process. There was no sense of a denominator, and so failure rates as percentages were impossible to derive. This omission in itself may say something about Navsarjan's early approach to the issue, in that it seems part of a "name and shame" strategy designed to spur the government into action,. In other words, rather gauging the relative extent of the various problems, Navsarjan was more interested in pointing out that the problems existed at all. This "zero tolerance" view is echoed in their stance on manual scavenging, which does not seek to diminish the practice, but to abolish it altogether. These change trends hint at two underlying phenomena. First, as I have argued, the government hierarchy represents contested terrain, on which offices geographically and institutionally closer to local elites may be more resistant to land reform, and offices more distant from local elites will be more susceptible to reform. Second, assuming that Navsarjan is the primary catalyst of change in the region, the trend may also reflect Navsarjan's strategy of selective engagement with various tiers of government. For while Navsarjan's tactics are not primarily top-down in nature, the aforementioned recalcitrance at lower levels of government (as well as the cost of trying to reform each of the hundreds of village governments in any given district) has the inevitable effect of driving the organization to focus increasingly on taluka, district, and state-level government interventions. This shift of focus may then come to resemble the "trickle-down" effect suggested by Figure 2 . 33 33 None of the effects of Navsarjan's own three-pronged efforts were assessed, whether disaggregated by prong or bundled. Simple lack of information on Navsarjan's program foci over the past 12 years is the principal cause of this omission. When asked if he would have been able to obtain his land without Navsarjan's help, though, one village Dalit said, "One hand needs the other to clap," hinting at Navsarjan's instrumental role in land reform.
B. Concluding Remarks
The line between the state and civil society in Gujarat is blurred with respect to land reform policy implementation. Instead of a neoliberal, monolithic state, we see that the state is a framework in which interests compete and in which groups like Navsarjan attempt to tip the scales in their cause's favor. They do this by coopting the process of "discursive demobilization," as described by Lynch, 34 such that the violent means of coercion employed by local large landholders are portrayed as being dissonant with the central state's internationally projected selfimage. As such, upper caste violence becomes a threat to the internal consistency and legitimacy of the Indian state. In effect, political mutualism grows between the Dalit movement and the Indian state, facilitated by the transnational resources of the Dalit movement itself. This has the intended effect of slowly cutting off local government offices dominated by upper-caste interests from each other, and breaking up their "state-within-a-state."
The equation between Navsarjan and the communities in which it works is not perfect, either, for while the group claims to be an organic outgrowth of the Dalit community, it does not merely reflect and communicate Dalit concerns. Rather, through transnational connections with other human rights organizations, Navsarjan continually pushes the edge of the envelope in formulating Dalit demands, while encouraging Dalit farmers to follow suit -often an act of defiance well outside the comfort zone of the community it purports to represent. While Navsarjan administration sometimes portray caste conflict over land as occurring between righteous Dalits and activist groups on the one hand, and nefarious upper castes and a complicit government on the other, in fact activists, farmers, and government form an uneasy triangle defined by their intercalation and what Sanyal terms "antagonistic cooperation."
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Although this study only examined one social movement in India, some tentative conclusions can be drawn about social movements in conflicted societies more generally. For one, the degree to which a social movement will undermine or reinforce the legitimacy of the state may be a function of whether the state is perceived as being a sufficient vehicle for advancing and recognizing a social claim, and what other mechanisms for doing so are available. This is most salient when considering that Dalits, though traditionally considered outcaste and thus outside of Hindu society, have in fact always been crucial to its functioning. private property did not necessarily entail a corresponding political upheaval in a government that ostensibly espoused social and economic rights for all. By contrast, tribal people of India have traditionally had little commerce or interdependence with wider Indian society, and their resources have been largely communal and non-monetized. The Maoist insurrection in which tribal people take part can, in that sense, be seen as a radical attempt at overthrowing neoliberal capitalism entirely and thus, in the words of Pugh, Cooper and Turner, at setting "their economic priorities including protection of economic activities from negative effects of global integration". 36 Lastly, it bears noting that to the extent that progressive transnational movements like the Dalit movement may iron out conflicts between central government policy and local government implementation, and begin to win over the "contested terrain" of state apparatuses, radical actors sanctioned and even supported by complicit local governments may increasingly operate outside the structure of state bureaucracy. For instance, the rightwing Hindu anti-Muslim riots that exploded in Gujarati cities in 2002, the notorious anti-Dalit Ranvir Sena militia in Bihar, and the brutal anti-Maoist Salwa Judum militia in Chhattisgarh all benefit from government-sponsorship at the sub-federal level. Each of them represents an outsourcing of regressive violence to disaffected privileged classes who are no longer able to manipulate the state apparatus to their advantage. It is these forces that, supported by some arm of the state, may most seriously challenge the integrity of the state in the long run.
